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PARTIES
The names of the original parties to this action are contained in the caption of
this brief. However, only Debbie A. Burke remains a Defendant in this instant
action.
"Defendant/5 hereinafter refers to Debbie A. Burke, the sole owner named on the
fee simple title of the real property at issue.
"Plaintiff/5 hereinafter refers to Mark D. Bergman, the carpenter/handyman hired
by the Defendant and Vince Isbell (hereinafter "Defendant's Agent55) to
complete various projects to the interior and exterior of the Defendant's real
property and home thereon.
Others of Significant Interest
"Defendant's Agent/5 (as defined above) is the Defendant's husband, a trial
witness for the Defendant, wrote, endorsed, and cashed the check that is the
foundation for the Plaintiff's 60(b) motion. The Defendant's Agent was also
charged with the oversight of the work performed by the Plaintiff for the
Defendant.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is within the general jurisdiction of Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)
(j) and does not involve any matter or issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Utah Supreme Court. After opinion the Utah Supreme Court, ordered this appeal
transferred to this Utah Appellate Court by order dated September 29,2008.

AUTHORITY FOR FEDERAL CASE LAW RELIANCE
The Plaintiffs reliance on the State of Utah and U.S. Federal case law
throughout this opinion is appropriate. See State v. Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App
226, PI4, 95 P.3d 1193 ("In circumstances in which Utah courts have not
definitively addressed an issue, it is appropriate to turn to decisions . . . that interpret
related federal rules for guidance."), cert, granted, 106 P.3d 743 (Utah 2004)
(quoting from Nat'l Advertising Co. v Murray City Corp. et. al., 131 P.3d 872 (2006
UT App)).
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
STANDARD OF REVIEW - DETERMINATIVE LAW
The primary issues to be determined on appeal include the following:
Issue (A): Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion on or about May 12,2008,
when it moved sua sponte and stayed the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion?
Standard of review: We review rule 60(b) determinations under an abuse of
discretion standard.
Determinative law: Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a
judgment. ~ (b) Stay on motion for a new trial or for judgment.
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-223. Decisions to be rendered within two months. ~
(1) A trial court judge shall decide all matters submitted for final
determination within two months of submission, unless circumstances
causing the delay are beyond the judge's personal control.
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102 (Superseded 01/01/09). Jurisdiction -- Appeals.
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal,
not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(4)

The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in the

circuit court prior to July 1, 1996.
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'"A trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown
[rule 60(b) grounds], and this Court will reverse the trial court's ruling only
when there has been an abuse of discretion."1 Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205,
206 (Utah 1998) (quoting Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 525 54 (Utah 1984)).
(quoting from Oseguera v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 UT App 46.)
Baker v. Western Sur. Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), We further
held that if the district court finds the motion to be without merit, it may enter
an order denying the motion, and the parties may appeal from that order.
Issue (B) : Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it elected to not inform the
Plaintiff or issue a court order detailing the grounds for the stay?
Standard of review: We review rule 60(b) determinations under an abuse of
discretion standard.
Determinative law: "Stay" As defined in Barron's Law Dictionary, Third Edition
~ STAY a judicial order whereby some action is forbidden or held in abeyance until
some event occurs or the court lifts its order.
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment.
~ (b) Stay on motion for a new trial or for judgment.
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-223. Decisions to be rendered within two months. ~
(1)

A trial court judge shall decide all matters submitted for final

determination within two months of submission, unless circumstances
Appellant's/Plaintiffs 60(b) Case Brief
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causing the delay are beyond the judge's personal control.
Bakerv. Western Sur. Co., 757 P.2dfc7fc(\Jtah C l App. \9Sfc), We f u s t a
held that if the district court finds the motion to be without merit, it may enter
an order denying the motion, and the parties may appeal from that order.
Issue (C) : Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion and/or commit a crime and/or
divest its jurisdiction over the 60(b) motion when the Trial Court violated Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-2-223(l)?
Standard of review: We review rule 60(b) determinations under an abuse of
discretion standard.
Peterminative law: Utah Code Ann.§76-2-304.Ignorance or mistake of fact or law.
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law
is no defense to a crime unless:
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-411. Crimes.
Any violation of the provisions of this chapter, except Section 78A-2-404, is
a misdemeanor.
Bakery. Western Sur. Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), We further
held that if the district court finds the motion to be without merit, it may enter
an order denying the motion, and the parties may appeal from that order.
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Issue (E) : Did the Trial Court exceed the bounds of sound discretion in denying
Plaintiffs 60(b) motion, without reviewing all of the evidence, without a hearing or
without considering any argument from the opposing party?
Standard of review: We review rule 60(b) determinations under an abuse of
discretion standard.
Determinative law: Canon 3.
(5). A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge
shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest
bias or prejudice
(7) A judge shall accord to every person who is legally interested in a
proceeding, or that person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to law.
Except as authorized by law, a judge shall neither initiate nor consider, and
shall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or
impending proceeding.
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and
fairly.
C. (1) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative
responsibilities without bias or prejudice, maintain professional competence
injudicial administration,
Appellant's/Plaintiffs 60(b) Case Brief
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case came for trial on November 13, 2007, before the Honorable Parley
R. Baldwin, on the Plaintiffs single cause of action relating to the foreclosure of a
mechanic's lien recorded upon the Defendant's real property, pursuant to which the
Plaintiff claimed to have a legal interest in the Defendant's real property and the
home thereon. After a two-day bench trial, Judge Baldwin requested the parties
submit closing arguments in writing, due to lack of available time of the Court.
On or about January 16, 2008, the Trial Court entered its final Judgment
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 54 on the record.
On or about January 24, 2008, the Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. Rule 59(a)(6), requesting the Trial Court to consider altering or amending its
judgment of January 16, 2008.
On or about April 3, 2008, the Plaintiff filed a motion, memorandum, and
affidavit with the Trial Court, pursuant to the Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b), requesting
relief from the Trial Court's judgment of January 16, 2008, due to fraud committed
on the court.
, On or about April 7, 2008, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal with the Trial
Court (Utah Appeal Case No. 20080323-CA), taken from the entire judgment
entered on January 16, 2008.

Appellant's/Plaintiffs 60(b) Case Brief
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THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DISCLOSE
THE STAY TO THE PLAINTIFF.
When the Trial Judge learned that the Plaintiff had discovered the stay,
months after it had been entered, and was communicating with the Utah Court
Administration, the Utah Judicial Council, and the Utah Judicial Conduct
Commission concerning the Trial Judge's violation of several Utah State Codes and
Utah Court Rules, Judge Baldwin changed his position on or about August 7, 2008
(108 days after the Plaintiff filed the Request to Submit), seized the Plaintiffs 60(b)
motion and denied it.
This appeal followed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The dates May 12 and May 13, 2008, play a very important role throughout
the following brief, and the Plaintiff requests that such date be given special
interest. One reason that May 12, 2008, is of interest to this action, the Plaintiffs
primary Docketing Statement for Utah Appellate Court Case No. 200800323-CA
became due on May 12, 2008 (SEE; Utah Supreme Court Order of April 29, 2008).
All parties to the said appeal are the same parties to the present appeal at issue, and
all parties are made aware of the filing deadlines by the Appeals court.
On or about July 1, 2008, the Plaintiff obtained a current copy of the case
docket. Examination of the docket revealed that on or about May 12, 2008, counsel
for the Defense communicated ex-parte with the Trial Judge, and such
communication resulted in the following events, none of which was disclosed or
communicated to the Plaintiff:
May 12, 2008
1. The Trial Clerk made two (2) separate entries stating that Judge Baldwin
signed and filed four (4) court orders. The Trial Court received these orders
twenty-five (25) days earlier on or about April 18, 2008, and the Plaintiff had
inquired several times as to their status, and was told time and time again,
when the Judge gets time he will sign them. The Plaintiffs efforts seemed to
fall on deaf ears at the court.
Appellant's/Plaintiffs 60(b) Case Brief
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May 12,2008
2. The Trial Judge requested the Trial Clerk to make an entry on the docket
"Tracking ended for under advisement" (removing the Plaintiffs 60(b)
motion from under advisement).
May 12,2008
3. The Trial Judge requested the Trial Clerk to make an entry on the docket
"Request to submit for decision is staved until there is a decision from the
Supreme Court," (the Trial Judge stayed the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion). The
Trial Judge also elected not to issue a court order, memorandum, or any
documentation concerning this stay. The only record of this ever happening
is on the case docket.
May 12,2008
4. The next entry on the case docket, Fee Account created: Total Due: $2.00
Payment Received: $2.00. (charge for a Court Clerk to make copies for
Defense Counsel).
May 13,2008
5. The next entry on the case docket, Filed: Notice of Appeal (Defense Counsel
files Notice of Appeal on behalf of the Defendant).

Appellant's/Plaintiffs 60(b) Case Brief
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The Plaintiff received by mail a copy of the Defendant's Notice of Appeal on
or about May 14, 2008. Attached thereto as Defendant's Exhibit "B" is a copy of
the four (4) court orders that are STAMPED NOT SIGNED on May 12, 2008.
An examination of the actual court orders on record at the court are in fact
signed by the Trial Judge, only the handwriting is very different where April is
scratched out and May is written in and the date 12th is also hand written, the real
court orders carry a different page placement of the date stamps, and they carry a
stamp on their face of the date filed on the record. The court orders on record with
the court are NOT the same documents that Defense Counsel attached as Exhibit
"B" to the Defendant's Notice of Appeal.
To examine the difference between the handwriting of the Trial Judge's and
the handwriting on the fake court orders is very easy. Defendant's Exhibit "A"
attached to the same Notice of Appeal is the Trial Judge's hand written 21 day of
February.
Further evidence that makes this entire incident viable and a highly likely
scenario of the actual events that occurred when the Plaintiff questioned the Chief
Deputy Clerk of the Court. The Plaintiff was advised, after checking the Trial
Judge's court log, that the Judge was not on the bench on May 12, 2008.
Other facts surrounding the STAMPED Court Orders that are attached to the
Defendant's Notice of Appeal that are also significant:
Appellant's/Plaintiffs 60(b) Case Brief
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1. The Trial Court did not mail copies of the stamped or signed orders to the
parties. It is not possible that Defense Counsel could have received the
orders by mail in Salt Lake City and subsequently have the Defendant's
Notice of Appeal filed with the Weber County Trial Court less than a full day
later at 1:36 PM on May 13, 2008. The U.S. Mail Carrier for the Defense
Counsel's address has confirmed to the Plaintiff, the address listed for the
Defense Counsel is in fact a late afternoon drop. The earliest possible time
that Defense Counsel could have received a mailed notice was late afternoon
of May 13,2008.
2. There is not another entry on the court docket that copies were made again on
or about the dates in question.
3. The only way for the Defense Counsel to have copies of the stamped orders,
is if the Defense Counsel was at the Trial Court when the orders were
stamped.
4. Regardless of motives, the Defendant in concert with its Counsel plotted to
cause the Plaintiff harm during trial. It appears that Defense Counsel has
involved an officer of the court based on the activity noted on the docket on
May 12, 2008. Not only were these actions a violation of court rules and
Utah law, the Plaintiffs case has been prejudiced and the impartial functions
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of the court have been directly corrupted.
5. Who benefited by the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion being stayed? The Trial Judge
does have some motives, as the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion attacks the very heart
of the credibility of the Trial Court's credibility findings. However, the
Defendant certainly had more to lose and the actions at issue here beg the
Court's review for possible sanctions relating to fraud, subordination of
perjury and submitting false evidence.
Upon discovery of these events, the Plaintiff became concerned as to the
ethics of the Trial Judge. It is apparent from the docket that the Trial Judge
willfully, knowingly and with intent violated court rules, broke the law, violated the
sanctity and integrity of the bench, caused material harm to the Plaintiff and,
engineered a break down of the judicial process to aid Defendant in the case.
This issue becomes apparent from a review of the docket, that the Defense
Counsel met with the Trial Judge ex-parte on May 12, 2008, and the Trial Judge
made a decision concerning the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion.
Upon learning the above the Plaintiff inquired of the Trial Clerk as to the
background on the stay requesting documentation of the action. The Clerk advised
the Plaintiff that "the court lacked jurisdiction because the case is under appeal,"
further advising that the Judge had instructed her to make the entries on the docket.
On or about July 16, 2008, after unsuccessfully pursuing answers from the
Appellant's/Plaintiffs 60(b) Case Brief
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Court Administrator, the Plaintiff also learned that its complaint to the Utah Judicial
Conduct Commission was stalled because the commission was waiting for new
appointments and three reaffirmations. The Plaintiff then contacted Mr. Brent
Johnson, Lead Counselor for the Utah Judicial Council. The Plaintiff explained the
situation to Mr. Johnson advising that he believed the Trial Court and the Judge
appeared to be in violation of: Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-223(l). A trial court judge
shall decide all matters submitted for final determination within two months of
submission, unless circumstances causing the delay are beyond the judge's personal
control. (Underline added).
The Plaintiff further explained that he contacted the Utah Judicial Council for
assistance because of: Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-223(2). The Judicial Council shall
establish reporting procedures for all matters not decided within two months of final
submission (underline added).
Mr. Johnson assured the Plaintiff that he would assist if he could. Thereafter,
on or about July 30, 2008, Mr. Johnson informed the Plaintiff by phone, that he had
contacted the Trial Judge and inquired as to the issue of the Trial Judge's refusal to
issue a decision on the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion, Mr. Johnson stated that the Judge
informed him that the court lacked jurisdiction over the motion because the case is
under appeal. Mr. Johnson also told the Plaintiff that the Trial Judge said that if the
Plaintiff would withdraw his appeal the Trial Court could then handle the 60(b)
Appellant's/Plaintiffs 60(b) Case Brief
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motion.
On August 4, 2008, the Plaintiff wrote a second letter to Mr. Johnson (the
first letter presented Utah ease law and the rules proving the court was in error), and
copied the same to Ms. Pat Bartholomew, a Utah Supreme Court Clerk. (SEE:
Exhibit "A" attached hereto). In such communication the Plaintiff states:
PageH2
"I believe the rules and laws are clear, Judge Baldwin has made a major missstep. I believe Judge Baldwin's jurisdiction issue is clearly false ~"
Page H 4
"Last Friday, August 1 2008,1 received my notice from the Appeals Court
that I am to start writing my brief for my Appeal. With that notice, I also
received a copy of the court record. Upon reviewing the record, I discovered
that all mention of what has happened to my motion is missing from the
record. Including any mention that my motion has been stayed, thus the
appeals court will never know that it existed. Brent, that is obstruction of
justice, and the Judge has no right to deny me justice."
Mr. Johnson forwarded the Plaintiffs letter to the Trial Judge on that same
day, and the Trial Judge denied the 60(b) motion three (3) days later. This action
leaves little doubt that the Trial Judge knew all along that the Trial Court retained
jurisdiction over 60(b) motions while the case was under appeal, and that the Trial
Appellant's/Plaintiffs 60(b) Case Brief
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Court was operating with reckless disregard for the truth and justice. As further
shown within the Trial Court's ruling; "The Court elected not to address the
motion, " (emphasis added), the Trial Judge was bias and abused its discretion, as it
is a well-established that:
ff

[T]he initial inquiry of any court should always be to determine whether the

requested action is within its jurisdiction.'1 Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux,
767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "When a matter is outside the
court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the action." Id.
(Quoting from AKJ v. State (In re PECO 2008 UT App 341)
Thus, the Trial Court had no authority or jurisdiction to elect not to address
the motion. Therefore, on May 12, 2008, when the Trial Court determined that it
lacked jurisdiction to rule on the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion, and took it out from under
advisement, then stayed the Request to Submit (be it right or be it wrong), the Trial
Court divested itself of jurisdiction over the motion. Hence, "When a matter is
outside the courtfs jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the action."
(Quoting from AKJ v. State On re DECJ) 2008 UT App 341).
The Trial Court only retained the authority to dismiss the action therefore the
ruling of August 7, 2008, is void. SEE: United States v. Buck, 2002 10CIR 260,
281 F.3d 1336, Appellants claim that the quiet title judgment should be set aside
under Rule 60(b)(4) because the judgment is void. A judgment is void "only if the
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court which rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or
acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." In re Four Seasons Sec.
Laws Litis., 502 F.2d 834, 842 (10th Cir. 1974).
As stated in United States v. Buck. 2002 10CIR 260, 281 F.3d 1336 "or acted
in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." The Trial Court's improper
actions divested itself of jurisdiction over the motion, making any ruling void.
Once the Trial Court started down that slippery slope with the Defense
Counsel, there was no coming back. Thus, all the safeguards within the judicial
system that have been put into place over the years became impaired and at risk.
SEE: Stonger v Sorrell 776 NE.2d 353, 358 (Ind. 2002). Nevertheless, fraud may
be found in the absence of an intent to defraud; indeed, fraud may be found even
where representations are made with a good faith belief in their truth. Whether the
deprivation of a party's rights by actions of the court are attributable to a willful
intent to defraud or a reckless disregard of rules or statutory provisions, the court
has the same duty to rectify the wrong. The mechanism for protecting an [sic]
maintaining the decisional integrity of our judicial system is found in the statutes
and rules which govern the procedures to be followed by parties, attorneys and
judges. The purposeful or reckless disregard of those procedural safeguards which
results in the deprivation of substantive rights constitutes an impermissible
corruption of the court process.
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12 Moore's Federal Practice, f 60.21[4][a], at 60-52 (3d ed. 2000), provides:
"Fraud on the court" is defined in terms of its effect on the judicial process, not in
terms of the content of a particular misrepresentation or concealment. Fraud on the
court must involve more than injury to a single litigant; it is limited to fraud that
"seriously" affects the integrity of the normal process of adjudication. Fraud on the
court is limited to fraud that does, or at least attempts to, "defile the court itself or
that is perpetrated by officers of the court "so that the judicial machinery can not
perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases."
Id. (footnote references omitted)(emphasis in original).
The Trial Court acted as if, and made statements to the effect, that it lacked
jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion. Yet, the jurisdiction issue proved not
to be true as evidenced by the Trial Court's action on or about August 7, 2008, when
the Trial Court acted without regard for jurisdiction, or to its violations of 78A-2223(1), without explaining that the delays were beyond the judge's personal control,
without notice to the parties, without removing the self imposed stay, without a
hearing, abruptly moved again and denied the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion stating;
On April 3, 2008, Plaintiff filed a motion under rule 60(b) for relief from the
Court's judgment of January 16, 2008. Having considered the affidavit of
Mr. Bergman and his memorandum, the Court denies the motion.
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On April 7, 2008, only four days after the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion was filed,
Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal taken from the entire judgment
elected not to address the motion, following

The Court

t(

the general rule that the trial

court is divested of jurisdiction over a case while it is under advisement on
appeal" Natl Advertising Co. v Murray City Corp. etal, 131 P.3d 872, 876
(Utah Ct App. 2006). The Court has learned, however, that the Utah
Supreme Court acknowledges an exception to this rule, which is that "trial
courts do have jurisdiction to consider rule 60(b) motions even though an
appeal is pending. " Id. at 877 Therefore, the Court now considers Plaintiff's
rule 60(b) motion, (emphasis added).
Wherefore, the Trial Court has exceeded its authority, abused its discretion,
violated the Plaintiffs rights to due process and as such, it is the duty of this Court
to reverse the ruling, SEE; Oseguera v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 UT App 46.

m

A

trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown [rule 60(b)
grounds], and this Court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when there has
been an abuse of discretion."1 Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998)
(quoting Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984)).
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Kendall Insurance v. R&R Group, 2008 UT App 235
A further example of how the Trial Court abused its discretion concerning the
Plaintiffs 60(b) motion, would be to compare it to a similar case. Hence, SEE:
Kendall Insurance v. R&R Group. 2008 UT App 235,
1. Exactly as in the Plaintiffs case, the same Judge presided (the Honorable
Parley R. Baldwin),
2. Exactly as in the Plaintiffs case, a party filed a motion pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. Rule 60(b) with the Trial Court (on or about May 26, 2006).
3. Exactly as in the Plaintiffs case, the same party that filed the 60(b) motion
also soon after filed an appeal based on the entire final judgment (on or about
June 16, 2006, case No. 20060570 - CA).
4. CONTRARY to the Plaintiffs case, in the Kendall Insurance v. R&R Group
case, the Trial Court treats the 60(b) motion completely different. The Trial
Court did not make-up any jurisdictional issues, nor did it stay the 60(b)
motion before it ruled on the motion.
Therefore, what the Kendall Insurance v. R&R Group case proves in relation
to the Plaintiffs case:
1. That the Trial Court knew that it was wrong staying the Plaintiffs motion as
it tried an almost identical set of proceedings two (2) years earlier.
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2. That when the Trial Court told the Plaintiff and Mr. Brent Johnson, "that it
lack jurisdiction" to rule on the 60(b) motion, the Trial Court spoke with the
knowledge that such was a complete falsehood,
3. That when the Trial Court stated in its ruling on the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion,
"The Court has learned, however" (emphasis added) stated such with the
knowledge that it was another falsehood,
4. As shown in the Kendall Insurance v. R&R Group case, the Trial Court knew
it had jurisdiction over 60(b) motions while appeals are pending,
5. That the Trial Court has abused its discretion and has no credibility left,
6. The Trial Court has disparaged the judicial system in the eyes of the public.
Therefore, it is appropriate for this court to void all findings of facts, conclusions
of law, judgments and rulings of this Trial Court and remand the entire case for a
new trial and that a new judge be appointed to the case.
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RELEVANT FACTS
EDITING THE TRIAL COURT'S CASE DOCKET
As one of the criteria of the Utah's Judicial Council performance compliance
standards applies to the time that cases are held under advisement, the Trial Court
Judge is aware of the importance of this issue. Therefore, when the Trial Court
Judge ordered the Trial Clerk to enter changes on the case docket and produced no
documentation for the parties or the record, the Trial Court abused its discretion.
Furthermore, just editing the case docket and doing it basically in secret, the
Trial Court's actions are to avoid possible judicial reprimands and or to prevent
from not meeting the minimum standards set by the judicial retention board. The
Judge simply removed the motion from under advisement, and that tricked the
court's motion tracker and the Judge's record is safe.
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Please take notice that on 05-12-08 tracking is ended for under advisement
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DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT FAILS TO REPLY TIMELY
The Defendant has refused to respond timely. There has been four (4) posttrial motions filed and the Defendant has not met the filing time deadline once,
including the motion at issue. Thus the Plaintiff has repeatedly insisted that the
pleading was complete and the motion is closed.
Nevertheless, it is extremely ironic that the Trail Court's ruling reads as if it
is from the Defendant's late reply. Even though, the Trial Court states that it only
reviewed the Plaintiffs pleadings before making a decision on the motion. Which
if the Trial Court reviewed the Plaintiffs pleadings, then it is the duty of the court to
handle the crimes that happened right in front of it.
The Plaintiff also gave the Trial Court an alternative provision with how to
handle the false evidence the Defendant provided, that being, do not allow the
Defendant the use of cash payments as proof of payments. Which it should have
never allowed in the first place.
The Trial Court's review is wrong, plain and simple, as it should be based
solely on the merits of a motion. This applies to the court's unwillingness to see
beyond the title of the motion and look to the substance of the plea. In Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co. v Hartford-Empire Co.. 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250
(1944). On appeal from that ruling the Supreme Court held the federal courts have
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inherent equitable power to grant relief in cases of after-discovered fraud regardless
of the "end of the term rule," and concluded that "every element of the fraud here
disclosed demands the exercise of the historic power of equity to set aside
fraudulently begotten judgments." The Court noted that this was not simply a case
of a judgment obtained with the aid of a witness who is believed possibly to have
been guilty of perjury, but was "a deliberately planned and carefully executed
scheme to defraud not only the Patent Office but the Circuit Court of Appeals." Id.
At 245, 64 S.Ct. At 1001. The Court rejected suggestions that a lack of diligence by
the aggrieved party could justify denial of relief, finding that tampering with the
administration of justice in the manner shown here involved more than an injury to
a single litigant and that the court's power to preserve the integrity of the judicial
process did not depend on the diligence of the litigants. Id. At 246, 64 S.Ct. At%
1001.
See: United States v. Buck. 2002 10CIR 260,281 F.3d 1336 stating, "In this
case no purpose would be served by denying Appellants relief on the ground that
the motion misstyled the plea for relief. The substance of the plea should control,
not the label. We should construe the motion either as an independent action, see 12
Moore's § 60.64, at 60-197; 11 Wright & Miller § 2868, at 405, or, because "there
are no formal requirements for asserting a claim of fraud on the court," 12 Moore's
§ 60.21 [4][f], at 60-60, as a pleading invoking the court's inherent power to grant
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relief for fraud upon the court."
Nonetheless, the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion is not a complicated issue, but it is
founded on material conclusive prima facie evidence that proves the Defendant and
Counsel collaborated to commit fraud upon the court. When it looked as if the
Plaintiff discovered such treachery, the Defense Counsel went to the Trial Court and
communicated ex-parte with the Trial Judge and hatched the scheme of May 12,
2008.
Fraud on the court... is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery
itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements
or perjury. It has been held that allegations of nondisclosure in pretrial discovery
will not support an action for fraud on the court. It is thus fraud... where the
impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted. Bulloch v. United
States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985). As stated in Weese v. Schukman, 98
F.3d 542, 552-53 (10th Cir. 1996),
Generally speaking, only the most egregious misconduct, such as bribery of a
judge or members of a jury, or the fabrication of evidence by a party in which an
attorney is implicated will constitute a fraud on the court. Less egregious
misconduct, such as nondisclosure to the court of facts allegedly pertinent to the
matter before it, will not ordinarily [* 12] rise to the level of fraud on the court.
(quoting Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1978)) (emphasis
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deleted).
Moreover, "fraud on the court," whatever else it embodies, requires a
showing that one has acted with an intent to deceive or defraud the court. A proper
balance between the interests underlying finality on the one hand and allowing relief
due to inequitable conduct on the other makes it essential that there be a showing of
conscious wrongdoing-what can properly be characterized as a deliberate scheme to
defraud-before relief from a final judgment is appropriate . . . . Thus, when there is
no intent to deceive, the fact that misrepresentations were made to a court is not of
itself a sufficient basis for setting aside a judgment under the guise of "fraud on the
court." Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft 56 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1995).
Proof of fraud upon the court must be by clear and convincing evidence. See Weese,
98F.3dat552
Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 552-53 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation
omitted). See also. Buck, 281 F.3d at 1342 ("It has been held that allegations of
nondisclosure in pretrial discovery will not support an action for fraud on the
court.") These parameters are strictly applied because a finding of fraud on the court
permits the severe consequence of allowing a party to overturn the finality of a
judgment. Weese, 98 F.3d at 553. Intent to defraud is an "absolute prerequisite" to a
finding of fraud on the court. Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft 56 F.3d 1259,
1267 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing the required intent element). See also, Yapp v.
Appellant's/Plaintiffs 60(b) Case Brief
33

Excel Com, 186 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999) (same).
Nonetheless, it is not the Plaintiffs position that the 60(b) motion at issue
may not have started out as a clear and convincing true case of fraud on the court,
but what happened after the Plaintiff filed the motion, left little room for doubt
about the truth of the Plaintiffs claims.
The Trial Court elected not to address the motion or issue a court order,
thereby blocking the Plaintiffs rights to an appeal. The Trial Court's only grounds
for such actions could only be placed upon the fact the Plaintiffs motion went to
the heart of the credibility issue, in contradiction of the Trial Court's findings of
fact, thereby the Plaintiff was trying to level the playing field when the Appeals
court reviews the Plaintiffs challenge of the Trial Court's finding of facts.
The general rule that the Trial Court speaks of in its ruling has not been the
general rule for more than twenty (20) years, as stated in: Baker v. Western Sur.
Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), "We further held that if the district court
finds the motion to be without merit, it may enter an order denying the motion, and
the parties may appeal from that order."
Additionally, in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 246, the Supreme Court
of the United States held that tampering with the administration of justice involves
far more than an injury to a single litigant. "It is a wrong against the institutions set
up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot
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complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society." Id. (quoting
from Stonger v. Sorrell 776 NE. 2d 353, 358 (Ind. 2002))
During trial the Plaintiff objected and was overruled when the defense
presented defense Exhibit D14 (as such exhibit lacked foundation and purports
several payments without any supporting evidence), states on payment line #8,
dated July 7, 2003, a Check from Golden West Credit Union Check #3348 for $500,
was paid to the Plaintiff. A copy of such check (amongst others), is not in evidence.
The 60(b) motion is the third time the Plaintiff brought a part of this same
issue before the Trial Court. The first time was during trial, as the Plaintiff objected
to D14 being admitted into evidence without evidence supporting all of the claims,
other than testimony. The second time is in the Plaintiffs closing arguments (page
7 U 3), as the Plaintiff points out that the testimony of the Defendant and her
husband (Mr. Vince Isbell) has inconsistencies as to the payments, amounts, start
date of work, work authorized and that the Plaintiff was to be paid for the work
performed on their Slaterville home.
Once the Plaintiff was able to get a copy of the check at issue, the Plaintiff
discovered that it was not made payable to the Plaintiff.
BEFORE THE PLAINTIFF REFERS THE COURT TO PARTS OF THE
DEFENDANT'S LATE REPLY, THE PLAINTIFF RESERVES THE RIGHT TO
STRIKE THE ENTIRE REPLY AT A LATER DATE.
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Had the Defendant's husband cashed the check and then brought the Plaintiff
the cash (as stated in the Defendant's late response page 2 ^ Response), then why
did the Defendant not list it as a cash payment? Just like the seven (7) other cash
payments the Defendant listed on Exhibit D14 and claimed to have paid to the
Plaintiff. Because they were lying.
If the Trial Court had really been interested injustice and taken an extra
minute, located the lawsuit mentioned on page 4 f 15 in the Plaintiffs Affidavit in
Support of Motion Presenting - (Plaintiffs 60(b)), it would have discovered that, In
the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Case No. 2:03-CV-750 TC.
On page 4 of the US Court's ORDER AND MEMORANDUM DECISION % E.
Declaration of Vince Isbell (as per the 180 paragraph declaration), stating:
"Otherwise, unless specifically addressed in this Order, the portions of Mr. Isbellfs
Declaration are inadmissible for reasons set forth in the Defendant's briefs.
Accordingly the court does not rely on them."
Mr. Vince Isbell (the Defendant's Agent, Husband, and trial witness), does
not provide reliable testimony. Yet, this Trial Court found it as the most credible.
Thus, as the Plaintiff attacked that fact with the evidence produced in the Plaintiffs
60(b) motion, the Trial Court did not want to discover anything else that might
prove its findings concerning credibility were wrong.
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Defense Exhibit D14 (titled - Payments made to Mark - see payment line
No.8), confirms that the Defendant and the Defendant's (husband) witness both
testified, under direct examination that on July 6, 2003, check #3348, issued in the
amount of $500, drawn on their joint account at Golden West Credit Union, was
made payable to Mark Bergman.
The Trial Court overruled the Plaintiffs objection and allowed the Defendant
to testify about such check, and the Trial Court relied upon the evidence, eventhough the Defendant did not produce a copy of check #3348.
However, when the Plaintiff obtained the check and presented it by means of
the 60(b) motion, the Trial Court could clearly see that such check was not made
payable to the Plaintiff, but rather it is made payable to CASH and endorsed by the
Defendant's husband, who cashed such instrument.
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THE TRIAL COURT RETALIATES
REFUSES TO EXAMINE EVIDENCE
On or about April 7, 2008, the Trial Court Clerk telephoned the Plaintiff and
requested the Plaintiff come to the courthouse and pick-up the CD the Plaintiff had
attached to the 60(b) motion as an exhibit. The Plaintiff informed the Clerk the CD
contained the Trial Court's video and audio footage of the Defendant and the
Defendant's witness actual trial testimony. Because the Plaintiff had a pending
motion before the Trial Court, the Plaintiff requested that the Trial Clerk retain the
CD as there might not be any further form of transcripts from the trial.
The Trial Clerk insisted regardless, well that maybe, and maybe you can use
it at a trial or hearing but no one at the court is going to put a CD in a computer and
watch it, and the Trial Court refuses to hold the CD in their evidence as an Exhibit
to the Plaintiffs motion, SEE: case docket April 7, 2008, Note: CD RETURNED
TO MARK BERGMAN. HE SET IT ON THE COUNTER AND REFUSED TO
TAKE IT AND LEFT IT ON THE COUNTER.
Because the Plaintiff refused to take the CD (as noted on the docket) and filed
a Notice of Appeal, the Trial Court retaliated (even though it was in violation of the
Utah Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration Rule 4-202.04(2)(D))
against the Plaintiff and denied the said pending motion before the close of court on
April 7, 2008. The main violation involved with this decision is, Rule 4-202.04(2)
Appellant's/Plaintiffs 60(b) Case Brief
38

(D) requires that the court SHALL hold a hearing, and after which the court SHALL
write a findings.
The Plaintiffs motion met all the requirements and the Plaintiff requested a
hearing. Only, this was not the first time the Trial Court retaliated and denied the
Plaintiff the right to be heard. On March 4, 2008, two (2) days after the Plaintiff
was finally granted access to copies of the Trial Exhibits, and the day after the
Plaintiff informed the Trial Clerk that evidence was missing from Exhibit D13, the
Trial Court denied the Plaintiffs motion pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 59(a)(6).
Thus, the Plaintiff finds that the Trial Court is bias and has been retaliating
for no just cause, and is abusing its discretion, when the Trial Court denied the
60(b) motion stating it found: "The reasons applicable to the Plaintiffs motion
include "newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) " ~ "Plaintiff does not
allege or show that the evidence could not have previously been discovered. "
(emphasis added).
Furthermore, the Trial Court knew why the Plaintiff could not have produced
the evidence in time for a Rule 59(b) motion, one reason being the Trial Judge
would not approve the Plaintiffs access to copies of exhibits for three (3) weeks,
another being the Plaintiff had moved timely pursuant to Rule 59 requesting the
court to consider altering or amending the judgment, and it was denied. Not to
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mention, it is standard knowledge that a subpoena has to grant the subject a
minimum of fourteen (14) days to comply. A motion pursuant to Rule 59 has to be
done within ten (10) days from the date of final judgment.
Within the Plaintiffs pleadings, the Plaintiff explains each step taken, the
reason, and the time-line needed to produce the missing evidence. Nonetheless, as
per the Trial Judge, the Kendall Insurance v. R&R Group case proves that the Trial
Judge's statements and rulings cannot be relied upon. Hence, had the Trial Judge
read the pleadings as implied, reviewed all the evidence (exhibit "B"), then the Trial
Court would have known that the Plaintiff did show that the evidence could not
have previously been discovered, and the Defendant, the Defendant's witness and
the Counsel for the defense all committed perjury and submitted false evidence.
The Plaintiff finds that the Trial Court abused its discretion, when the Trial
Court found; "Plaintiff alleges that the witnesses for Defendant lied at trial And
provides as "newly discovered" evidence of this a copy of a check However,
Plaintiffs evidence fails to prove that Defendant's witnesses gave false testimony"
(emphasis added).
The Trial Court has failed to recognize what is basic prima facie evidence.
The Plaintiff provided a check as evidence, the Defendant has admitted to writing
and cashing the check and that the check is not made payable to the Plaintiff.
Therefore, the said check at question is PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE and as
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such, Our supreme court has defined "prima facie evidence11 as follows: mSuch
evidence as, in the judgment of the law is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the
group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or depose, and which if not
rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient/" State v. Asay, 631 P.2d 861, 864
(Utah 1981) (citation omitted), (quoting from J.V. Hatch Constr., Inc. v. Kampros,
971 P.2d 8, 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). Therefore, it is not within the Trial Court's
discretion to dispute something that is prima facie evidence, thus the Trial Court has
abused its discretion.
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Conclusion and Statement of Relief Sought
For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court's final judgment and rulings should be
found as an abuse of its discretion and are void, thereby nullifying all findings of
facts, conclusion of law, rulings and judgments.
That this court finds that the use of unconfirmed payments made with cash are to
be disallowed and not entered into evidence.
That this court finds that the defendant is to replace the escrowed funds into the
court upon remand, and that failure to do such shall result in findings of contempt of
court, and ordered to show cause.
That this court finds that the Defendant, the Defendant's witness Mr. Vince
Isbell, and Defendant's counselor are to be brought before the court for matters
relating to fraud on the court.
That the Plaintiff has prevailed on appeal.
That any and all just matters found by this court be applied.
Wherefore, this court reverses this present action and remands the entire matter
for a new trial before a new judge, consistent with the opinion of this court.
Respectively submitted,

i
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY THAT ON THE O

DAY OF DECEMBER, 2008 THE

FOREGOING CASE BRIEF WAS SERVED ON THE DEFENDANT/ Appellee
BY MAILING A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY VIA FIRST-CLASS U.S. MAIL,
POSTAGE PREPAID TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS;

Respectfully,

Wj^lSoAevp

^

Atty. For the Defendant/ Appellee
Michael E. Bostwick (7037)
6776 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, UT. 84121
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Mark D. Bergman
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August 4,2008
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Case #04092444 -Judge Baldwin

Re:
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FOR REVIEW
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[Click here and type reference number]

PLEASE COMMENT
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NOTES/COMMENTS:

Dear Brent
Please contact me or have someone from your office keep me informed as to what is your
decision. Thank you for your time.

Respectively^

M . D . B E R G M A N • 545 E A S T 1100 N O R T H • O G D E N , U T A H 84404
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August 4, 2008
RE: Jurisdiction and Signature Stamp
Mr. Brent Johnson
Judicial Counsel Legal Depart.
S.L.C,Utah
Dear Mr. Johnson,
I hope that you have received my fax and voice messages concerning the signature
stamp issues and the court's jurisdiction. I am sorry that these issues are taking up so much
of your time but, I did not create the problem, I am just trying to set matters back on track.
Speaking of which, I want you to understand my intent is only so I might get justice in my
case. I am not looking for more people to sue. Believe me; I know what kind of complaint
I could file against the Judge and his in-court clerk, but who needs the headache.
Nonetheless, I believe the rules and laws are clear, Judge Baldwin has made a major
miss-step. I believe Judge Baldwin's jurisdiction issue is clearly false and the improper
stamping of the orders is a violation of the rules. However, if the Judge can prove
otherwise, I will go away quiedy. I feel I have tried everything I could think of to give the
Judge a way out, but he has refused repeatedly. At least I was trying until I discovered this
fake stay I know that my motion changes everything about the findings of fact and the final
judgment, but that kind of thing can and does happen. I am sure Judge Baldwin never
thought that I could prove conclusively that the defendant committed perjury and that their
Attorney subordinated the same.
For me, it was easy, because as I listened to the defendant and her husband testify
about the alleged payments, they paid to me, and that they could not produce a copy of one
of the checks that they made out to me. I knew right where to go, only I tried everything
first. I called the defendants Attorney and asked for a copy of the missing check, I brought
it to the attention of the court that one of the checks was not in evidence. Then, being left
with no other choice, I issued a subpoena, had the Sheriff serve it, and then I waited. When
I received the defendant's banks records, I knew the Judge could not deny documented
proof of the fraud committed by the defendant. Sure, the defendant had lied about a lot of
things while the defendant and her husband were on the stand, but there is no walking away
from this one.
Last Friday, August 1 2008,1 received my notice from the Appeals Court that I am to
start writing my brief for my Appeal. With that notice, I also received a copy of the court
record. Upon reviewing the record, I discovered that all mention of what has happened to
my motion is missing from the record. Including any mention that my motion has been
stayed, thus the appeals court will never know that it existed. Brent, that is obstruction of
justice, and the Judge has no right to deny me justice.
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CONCLUSION
Therefore, this is what I will setde for. First, I believe you have grounds to put Judge
Baldwin's in-court clerk, Debbie, on administrative leave and the court orders she improperly
used the signature stamp on to be withdrawn. That will also require that the defendant's
appeal be withdrawn too, as there will be no final judgment or order, the appeals court will
have no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Once the matter is cleared up the defendant can
refile if they so wish.
Judge Baldwin to set a hearing for tomorrow or the next day, starting at 10:00am will
be fine. I do not care if he has court scheduled; he brought this thing on himself. Now he
is going to fix it. Judge Baldwin is to order that the defendant be contacted and informed
that they are required to attend, or they will be held in contempt.
We will hold a hearing on my motion of which I do not think it should take us past
lunch. One last thing, I would like you to attend, if you can. I believe Judge Baldwin will do
what is required by law and I will feel much better about the whole thing just knowing that I
can talk to you afterwards. After that, I do not care what the Judicial Counsel decides to do
with the Judge and his Clerk.

Sincerely,

Mark D. Bergman

CC: Pat Bartholomew

Exhibit A

ADDENDUM
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES VERBATIM
The controlling provision relating to the issues of the Trial Court's abuse of
discretion when it denied the Plaintiff's 60(b) motion, are as follows:
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all
or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes;
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury,
the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony,
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from
having a fair trial.
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of
the jurors.
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application,
which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the
trial.

(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice.
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it
is against law.
(a)(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days
after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under
Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a
motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion.
The opposing party has 10 days after such service within which to serve opposing
affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be
served may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either by
the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court
may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of
its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have
granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds
therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment
shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.

Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud,
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for
fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall
be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment.
(a) Delay in execution. No execution or other writ to enforce a judgment may issue
until the expiration often days after entry of judgment, unless the court in its
discretion otherwise directs.
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment. In its discretion and on such
conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, the court may stay the
execution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending the disposition of
a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made pursuant to Rule 59,
or of a motion for relief from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a
motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict made
pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for amendment to the findings or for additional
findings made pursuant to Rule 52(b).
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory order
or final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the court in its
discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency
of the appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper for the security of the
rights of the adverse party.
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken, the appellant by giving a
supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by
law or these rules. The bond may be given at or after the time of filing the notice of
appeal. The stay is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by the court.
(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof. When an appeal is taken by the
United States, the state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, or by direction of
any department of either, and the operation or enforcement of the judgment is
stayed, no bond, obligation, or other security shall be required from the appellant.

(f) Stay in quo warranto proceedings. Where the defendant is adjudged guilty of
usurping, intruding into or unlawfully holding public office, civil or military, within
this state, the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed on an appeal.
(g) Power of appellate court not limited. The provisions in this rule do not limit any
power of an appellate court or of a judge or justice thereof to stay proceedings or to
suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction, or extraordinary relief or to make
any order appropriate to preserve the status quo or the effectiveness of the
judgment subsequently to be entered.
(h) Stay of judgment upon multiple claims. When a court has ordered a final
judgment on some but not all of the claims presented in the action under the
conditions stated in Rule 54(b), the court may stay enforcement of that judgment
until the entering of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such
conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor
the judgment is entered.

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-223. Decisions to be rendered within two months —
Procedures for decisions not rendered.
(1) A trial court judge shall decide all matters submitted for final
determination within two months of submission, unless circumstances
causing the delay are beyond the judge's personal control.
(2)

The Judicial Council shall establish reporting procedures for all

matters not decided within two months of final submission.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102 (Superseded 01/01/09). Jurisdiction -Appeals.
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in the
circuit court prior to July 1, 1996.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Amended by Chapter 115, 2008 General Session
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law. ~
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law
is no defense to a crime unless:
Amended by Chapter 32, 1974 General Session
Utah Code Ann. §78A-2-411. Crimes.
Any violation of the provisions of this chapter, except Section 78A-2-404, is
a misdemeanor.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session

Chapter 12. Code of Judicial Conduct.
Canon 3. A judge shall perform the duties of the office impartially and diligently.
(5). A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge
shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest
bias or prejudice
(7).

A judge shall accord to every person who is legally interested in a

proceeding, or that person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to law.
Except as authorized by law, a judge shall neither initiate nor consider, and
shall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or
impending proceeding.
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and
fairly.
C. (1) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative
responsibilities without bias or prejudice, maintain professional competence
injudicial administration,
Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.3. Candor Toward the Tribunal,
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a)(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a
false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the
lawyer;
(a)(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(a)(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. -

